After FOCAC: Have China-Africa relations finally turned a corner, or was FOCAC V simply more of the same?

Abstract

Recently, African Heads of State and China met in Beijing for the fifth FOCAC ministerial meeting, the latest in a twelve year process that has seen increasing exchanges of capital, goods and services, scholarship and people between the continent and China. The increasing value of this relationship is probably best illustrated by the consecutively larger financial overtures China has made to Africa at each respective event; in 2006 China promised US$5 billion in loans and assistance, in 2009, they doubled it to US$10billion, and in mid-July 2012, President Hu again doubled China’s African stake with a promise of US$20 billion in loans and credit over the next three years. Attendance was unlike the summit in 2006, though, less than a quarter of leaders of the fifty registered FOCAC members actually pitched up, though most states did send at least some sort of ministerial or diplomatic representation. This turnout was more likely due to China’s last minute shifting of the conference from end October to end July, than some sort of antagonism from the African side. From the media response, you might imagine this was the single greatest thing that occurred during those two days - and indeed, it’s a hefty (promise of) investment in the relationship going forward, but it’s also nothing new. Africa is a long time recipient of Chinese largesse, as the continent of foreign and commercial policy interest to China. However, looking past the diplomatic pomp and pageantry, and setting aside the big figure promises pasted across the headlines for a moment, the FOCAC V also signified something both a little less expected, and that many in the China-Africa game have been waiting for a while to see.